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b Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, IndiaAbstract Securitisation has emerged as an innovative and structured product that meets the
funding requirements of microfinance institutions (MFIs). This paper provides a contextual note
on the microfinance sector and the financial sources of MFIs. The note is followed by interviews
with senior executives of two microfinance institutions on the securitisation deals of microfi-
nance institutions. We argue in our note that the microfinance sector needs to be revived to
meet the broader goal of financial inclusion. Banks and MFIs have to collaborate with each
other to meet this objective. Banks have to encourage MFIs to shift over to low cost finance
either by giving direct loans or through innovative deals like securitisation. Commercial banks
have to leverage MFIs for their origination and recovery capabilities in small loans.Introduction
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doi:10.1016/j.iimb.2011.12.002(MFIs) were non-profit organisations with a mission to
alleviate poverty by helping the poor develop vocational
and business management skills, and by giving them small,
uncollateralised loans, mostly to be used as working
capital. From a small beginning in South Asia and many
Latin American countries in the 70s, microfinance now
encompasses more than 10,000 organisations and regulated
financial institutions across the globe, which offer an array
of credit, savings, housing finance, remittance, and insur-
ance products to serve the people at the bottom of the
pyramid (BOP) (Trant, ‘Capitalizing on Microfinance.’).
Despite the vast expansion of the banking system in India
and in many other countries, the last mile connectivity is
still a distant dream for the formal banking system. The two
important factors, according to Armendariz and Morduch
(2005, p. 14), for banks not lending to the poor are:
adverse selection or banks not being able to determine
which customers are likely to be more risky than others;
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customers are making the fullest effort to ensure the
success of their investment projects. Moral hazard also
arises when customers try to abscond with the bank’s
money. These problems are much more serious in enforcing
contracts in regions with weak legal systems. The following
are well stated facts about the microfinance sector by
several studies and reports1:
 It addresses the concerns of poverty alleviation by
enabling the poor to work their way out of poverty.
 It provides credit to that sectionof society that is unable to
obtain credit at reasonable rates from traditional sources.
 Since microfinance customers are mainly women, it
enables economic empowerment of women by routing
credit directly to them, thereby enhancing their status
within their families, the community and society at large.
 Easy access to credit is more important for the poor
than cheaper credit which might involve lengthy
bureaucratic procedures and delays.
 Microfinance loans are uncollateralised loans, as the
poor are often not in a position to offer collateral to
secure credit.
 The tenure of the loans is short, normally not more than
24 months. The frequency of repayments is greater
than for traditional commercial loans.
 The microfinance sector offers small size individual
loans; thus transaction and operating costs are very high.
 The loans are mainly utilised for income generation,
repayment of old debts and meeting domestic obliga-
tions like marriage, health and education.
In the Indian context, microfinance gained momentum in
1992 with the introduction of the Self Help Group (SHG)-
Bank Linkage program by the National Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development (NABARD). Subsequently several
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), societies and non-
banking financial companies (NBFCs) have entered the
microfinance sector. Currently three popular models of
microfinance are operating in India (RBI Report, 2011).
These are the SHG-Bank Linkage model, NBFC-MFI model
and others e mainly trusts and societies.
The SHG-Bank Linkage model
The SHG-Bank Linkage model was pioneered by NABARD in
1992. Under this model, women in a village are encour-
aged to form a self-help group and members of the group
regularly contribute small savings to the group. An SHG is
a group of about 15e20 people from a homogeneous class
who join together to address common issues. These
savings which form an ever growing nucleus are lent by
the group to members, and are later supplemented by
loans provided by banks for income generating activities
and for sustainable livelihood promotion. Banks have been
providing loans to SHGs in certain multiples of the accu-
mulated savings of the SHGs. Loans are given without any1 RBI Report, 2011; Srinivasan N., 2010; ‘Status of Microfinance in
India: 2009e10’, NABARD (2011).collateral and at interest rates decided by banks. Banks
are comfortable lending money to the groups as the
members have already achieved some financial discipline
through their thrift and internal lending activities. The
peer pressure in the group ensures timely repayment and
becomes social collateral for the bank loans. This model
accounts for about 58% of the outstanding loan portfolio
of the microfinance sector.MFI-Non-Banking Finance Companies (MFI-NBFC)
model
This model accounts for about 34% of the outstanding loan
portfolio. Under the MFI-NBFC model, NBFCs encourage
villagers to form Joint Liability Groups (JLG) and give loans to
the individual members of the JLG. The individual loans are
jointly and severally guaranteedby the othermembers of the
group. Many of the NBFCs operating this model started off as
non-profit entities providing microcredit and other services
to the poor. However, as they found themselves unable to
raise adequate resources for the rapid growth of the activity,
they converted themselves into for-profit NBFCs. Perceiving
this as a viable business proposition, others entered the field
directly as for-profit NBFCs. Significant amounts of private
equity funds have consequently been attracted to this
sector, which has led the sector to be driven more by
commercial motives than social (RBI Report, 2011).
The third model is NGOs, Trusts and Cooperative Socie-
ties accounting for the balance 8% of the outstanding loan
portfolio.
The SHG-Bank Linkmodel is drivenmore by social motives
and shows a slow growth rate, while the MFI-NBFC model is
a very fast growing commercial model of microfinance.
Srinivasan N. (2010) provides detailed information on
microfinance activities, portfolio and growth rates over the
last four years. Following are a few important observations
from the report that depict the status of the microfinance
activity in India.
 The number of self help groups linked to commercial
banks at the end of March 2010 stood at 4.58 million
and the amount of loans outstanding at Rs 272.66
billion.
 The total number of clients reported by 260 MFIs at the
end of March 2010 was 26.7 million.
 The total microfinance sector loan portfolio constitutes
1.4% of total bank credit which is Rs 32,447 billion.
 Average loan size of an SHG member is Rs 4570 and of
the MFI customer is Rs 6060.
 In the SHG-Bank Link programme loans are provided
against savings and the average loan to savings ratio is five
times. It varies fromaminimumof twotoamaximumof22.
 The nominal yield on advances of the microfinance
portfolio is 30%.
 The repayment rate is 96%.
 The outstanding microfinance loans stood at about Rs
450 billion this year, an increase of 90 billion. The MFI-
NBFC channel was seen to be fast catching up with the
SHG-Bank Linkage programme (SBLP), with the latter
growing at only about 8% compared to the MFI channel
which grew at 18%.
Table 1 Savings of SHGs placed with banks (Rs in million).
2008 2009 2010 Average savings per SHG
Commercial banks 36,812.7 27,729.9 20,773.3 9060
Regional rural banks 12,697.7 19,897.5 11,664.9 7714
Cooperative banks 14,069.8 7828.8 5411.7 12,688
Total 37,853.9 55,456.2 63,580.2 9325
Source: Srinivasan (2010) Microfinance India: State of the sector report, 2010.
2 http://www.citi.com/citi/press/2010/100505a.htm.
3 http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/20/elizabeth-littlefield-
microfinance-biz-cz_el_1220littlefield.html.
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financial sources of the microfinance sector and to
emphasise the securitisation deals of MFIs. The note
provides the context to interviews with the heads of two
large MFIs that have raised funds through securitisation
deals.
Financial resources of MFIs
Savings and deposits
Internationally micro saving products, also known as retail
deposits, offered by MFIs serve as a low cost source of
funding and are a common practice in countries like the
Philippines, Uganda, Pakistan, Peru and Kenya (‘Funding
Sources for Microfinance Institutions .’). Most govern-
ments only allow microfinance banks to offer micro saving
products and prohibit other MFIs from raising deposits. The
potential pitfall of these deposit products is that MFIs may
fail to provide instantaneous liquidity. In India, the SHG
model is primarily built up on mobilisation of savings
(Table 1). SHG members borrow funds from banks against
these deposits.
Individual philanthropic sources and social
investors
Non-profit investors, such as individuals interested
purely in the social impact of microfinance, often lend
their own money to MFIs through peer-to-peer online
platforms, internationally the most famous of which are
Kiva and MicroPlace (‘Funding Sources for Microfinance
Institutions .’). Similarly, high net worth individuals
who are interested in philanthropy often give away great
sums of money to MFIs, in acts known as ‘venture
philanthropy’.
Social investors are individuals or institutions (high net
worth, foundations, endowments, and retirement plans)
which choose to apply non-financial characteristics to
their investment decision making. These non-financial
characteristics are often related to the investors’ value
system or social mission, and may include concern for
environmental protection, social and economic develop-
ment of the poor, education and health, as priorities. For
example, in India Rang De, an MFI raises money from social
investors. Commercial institutions also participate in such
social investment. For example, Citibank provides chari-
table contributions to three local MFIs in Haiti to help
restore the country’s microfinance industry which hassuffered severe challenges in the aftermath of the 2010
earthquake.2
Soft loans and grants
Concessionary or soft loans (low cost debt) or grants are
another source of funds from socially responsible investors,
which include national and regional development banks,
international NGOs, non-profit corporations, charitable
trusts, or funds held by donor and development agencies,
such as the Grameen Trust, Swedish International Devel-
opment Agency (SIDA), United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development(USAID), United Nations Capital
Development Fund (UNCDF), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation, Ford Foundation, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), ACCION and CARE. Some development agencies only
interact with governments, but their funds can be accessed
either directly or indirectly by MFIs (‘Funding Sources for
Microfinance Institutions .’).
Investment funds
Internationally there are many investment funds that
specialise in microfinance. These funds are concentrated in
the lending institutions in Latin America and Eastern Europe,
but their pool of available capital is growing fast. Big banks
are also entering the field: Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, TIAA-
CREF, Morgan Stanley, ABN AMRO and Societe Generale are
deploying their structuring and fund-management skills to
offer investment products that appeal to a broad range of
investor risk profiles and social motivations.3
Microfinance investment vehicles
Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) are private entities
which act as intermediaries between investors and micro-
finance institutions. MIVs may be self-managed, managed by
an investment management firm, or by trustees. They may
receive investments through the issuance of shares, units,
bonds or other financial instruments. Depending on the type
of MIV, these investments may then be provided to MFIs as
debt, equity, or guarantees. MIVs make use of different
currencies as well, since they are located all over the world.
Table 2 Commercial banks’ loans to microfinance (as of end March 2010).
Loans distributed to MFIs in
2009e10(Rs in million)
Loans outstanding as on 31 March
2010 (Rs in million)
Public sector banks 42,766 51,957
Private sector banks 27,446 36,498
Foreign banks 7611 10,944
Regional rural banks 241 522
SIDBI 26,657 38,082
Total 104,722 138,005
Source: Srinivasan (2010) Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report, 2010.
4 Support offered to MFIs’; http://www.sidbi.in/Micro/mfi.htm.
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tionally combine the objective of social impact. This diver-
sity among MIVs makes it possible for many different types of
investors to get involved in the microfinance sector. These
have the capacity to conduct the specialised due diligence
and monitoring required for sound investing in this niche
market, and fund investing confers the added benefit of
diversification across many MFIs, countries and currencies.
The International Association of Microfinance Investors
(IAMFI) estimates that as of April 2009 there are 104 MIVs
with a total of $6.1 billion in assets under management
(‘Microfinance Investment Vehicles’; IAMFI).
In the Indian context, such potential has not been
captured so far. The RBI Report (2011) suggests that to
meet the funding requirements of the sector, a ‘domestic
social capital fund’ may be established. This fund will be
targeted towards ‘social investors’ who are willing to
accept ‘muted’ returns, say, 10%e12%. This fund could then
invest in MFIs which satisfy social performance norms laid
down by the fund and are measured in accordance with
internationally recognised measurement tools.
Quasi-equity
The World Bank in collaboration with the Small Industries
Development Bank of India (SIDBI) has designed a project to
offer MFIs a new kind of quasi-equity product aimed at
strengthening MFI balance sheets. Similarly NABARD is also
supporting MFIs with the Microfinance Development and
Equity Fund.
Non-convertible debentures
In an attempt to create new avenues to raise funds, non-
convertible debentures (NCDs) were issued by MFIs. The
country’s first ever NCD issue that was listed on the stock
exchange was by SKS Microfinance. It had raised Rs. 750
million at a coupon rate of 10% in May 2009, which was soon
followed by another issue of SKS and Grameen Koota. MFIs
have increasingly tapped the NCD route to create a diver-
sified lender base.
Bank loans
In the Indian context, commercial banks lend to MFIs and
SHGs. Commercial banks in India have to meet the
mandatory requirement of lending 40% of their advances to
the priority sector. Thus banks are a major source offinance to MFIs and their interest rate is 12e14%. Both
short-term loans and long-term debt can be acquired from
commercial banks. Table 2 gives a view on commercial
banks’ outstanding loans to microfinance.
The Small Industries Development Bank of India, an apex
financial institution for promotion, financing and develop-
ment of small scale industries in India, has launched a major
project e the SIDBI Foundation for Micro Credit (SFMC) e to
facilitate the accelerated and orderly growth of the micro-
finance sector in India. SFMC is emerging as the apex
wholesaler for microfinance in India providing a complete
range of financial and non-financial services such as loan
funds, grant support, equity and institution building support
to the MFIs. SIDBI also provides equity capital to eligible
institutions to meet the capital adequacy requirements and
to raise debt funds. Keeping in tune with the sectoral
requirements, SIDBI has also introduced quasi-equity prod-
ucts viz, optionally convertible preference share capital,
optionally convertible debt and optionally convertible
subordinate debt for new generation MFIs which are gener-
ally in the pre break-even stage requiring special dispensa-
tion for capital support by way of a mix of Tier I and Tier II
capital. The Transformation Loan (TL) product is envisaged
as a quasi-equity type support to partner MFIs that are in the
process of transforming their existing structure into a more
formal and regulated set-up for exclusively handling micro-
finance operations in a focused manner. Being quasi-equity
in nature, the TL helpsMFIs not only in enhancing their equity
base but also in leveraging loan funds and expanding their
microcredit operations on a sustainable basis. The product
has the feature of conversion into equity after a specified
period of time, subject to the MFI attaining certain struc-
tural, operational and financial benchmarks. This non-
interest bearing support facilitates the young but well per-
forming MFIs in making long term institutional investments
and acts as a constant incentive to MFIs to transform them-
selves into formal and regulated entities.4
Private equity
The private equity market is an important source of funds
for start-ups, private middle-market companies and firms in
financial distress. The huge demand for credit among the
poor has become an attractive investment avenue for
private equity and venture capital investors. These
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oriented ventures where a conventional source of funding is
difficult. Sequoia Capital India was the first traditional
venture capital (VC) firm to invest in the space with 11.5
million USD in SKS Microfinance in 2007. The International
Finance Corporation (IFC), the investment arm of the World
Bank, has invested 300,000 USD in Utkarsh Microfinance
Private Limited, a microfinance startup providing loans in
northern India. The amounts raised through private equity
deals are showing an increasing trend (Table 3), indicating
that microfinance is a high return investment avenue. With
India being a very attractive market in this field, many
private equity firms have started investing here.
Equity from capital market sources
MFIs have also started accessing resources through the
capital market. Internationally a few microfinance institu-
tions such as Bank Rakyat at Indonesia (BRI), BRAC Bank in
Bangladesh, Banco Compartamos in Mexico and Equity Bank
in Kenya have raised equity capital through public issue.
The four institutions are well known throughout the
microfinance industry for their exceptional growth, robust
financial performance and ability to expand their outreach
to the working poor. They are now listed on national stock
exchanges and, in two cases, have sold internationally
(Lieberman, Anderson, Grafe, Campbell, & Kopf, 2008).
The initial public offerings (IPOs) and listings have allowed
the four institutions to tap into the mainstream investor
community and take advantage of myriad new opportuni-
ties. This has also signalled to capital markets that the
microfinance sector is a potential source of profitable
investment. Raising capital through public issue has
increased liquidity for investors by creating opportunities
for equity investors to exit, especially those who contribute
as private equity and seed capital. This has made micro-
finance an attractive investment avenue for private
investors.
In the Indian context, the SKS IPO is a milestone event.
The Hyderabad based SKS Microfinance floated its first
public offering of equity and mobilised 358 million USD,
priced at 1.6 billion USD. The shares which were over-
subscribed 13.7 times (primarily by institutional investment
interest) fixed the price per share at Rs 985 reflecting
a valuation of 98 times the face value of shares. Overall,
the valuation accorded a book value to market value ratio
of six times. Microfinance has got the attention of the
capital market and around six other MFIs are aspiring to
enter the equity market with their own share floats.Table 3 Amounts raised by MFIs through private equity
deals.
Financial year Amount USD (in millions) No of deals
2007e08 52 3
2008e09 178 11
2009e10 209 29
2011-Q1 66 6
Source: Srinivasan (2010) Microfinance India: State of the Sector
Report, 2010The successful mobilisation of equity capital through the
IPO mode by Banco Compartamos of Mexico in 2007 and the
Indian microfinance company SKS in 2010 has invited wide-
spread criticism on the grounds that the social motivations
of MFIs are largely diluted and they have transformed into
pure profit oriented institutions. The issues here are: Are
IPOs the way to go for the sector? Who are the beneficiaries
of IPOs? Should the wealth created be reploughed or repa-
triated? Private investors look for exceptional profits and
higher dividends, forcing MFIs to charge high interest rates.
In the initial stages, MFIs receive grants and social capital as
seed capital and when MFIs make profits enriching private
investors, it is unethical (Rosenberg, 2007).
With the IPO activity, focus has shifted to high valuations
and preferential allotments to senior executives and other
employees. SKS allotted shares to their CEO and other
senior executives, who became millionaires overnight by
selling their shares post IPO listing (Sriram, 2010). Post IPO,
several governance issues cropped up in both these insti-
tutions and in the case of SKS, the share price dropped from
Rs 1100 to Rs 120.
Sriram (2010) has analysed in depth the commercialisa-
tion of microfinance institutions and expressed the need for
introspection ofmicrofinance business models. Reddy (2011)
also raises concerns about the profit motivations of MFIs and
need for a suitable model for the microfinance business.Assignment and securitisation
The rapid growth in the microfinance sector, especially of
NBFC-MFIs has led to the search for innovative financial
sources to meet the financial requirements of the sector.
The need for securitisation is common to all financial
intermediaries, but when it comes to microfinance, the
growing asset size (which is the very essence of micro-
finance economics) puts pressure on the balance sheet.
Hence, off-balance sheet methods of funding, or any
devices other than plain balance sheet borrowing are
needed to sustain the growth rate.
Three forms of structured financial products have gained
significance; these are: bilateral loan assignments, securi-
tisation and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).
In the case of assignment, the loan pool receivables
are directly assigned to the assignee or the purchaser,
usually a bank. These deals are also rated but no specific
instrument like pass-through certificate (PTC) is issued.
Effectively these could be loan pools originated by the
buyer (bank itself). Banks often prefer this route as the
loans need not be marked-to-market (as they are on the
banking books), whereas the securities against those loan
pools (as in the case of securitisation), if issued by the
same seller will have to be marked-to-market (as they are
securities and hence will be on the bank’s trading books).
Besides this, banks will be able to pick and choose the
loans that qualify for priority sector lending norms, and
hence such transactions fit exactly into their objective.
So, banks usually go in for bilateral assignment during the
fag-end of the financial year, based on their requirement
for such loan pools. Further, most banks also offer
competitive rates if they are keen to have such loans on
their books. While such financing for MFIs from banks is
Table 4 Major securitisation deals in 2009e10.
Originator Amount (Rs in millions)
SKS Microfinance 1000 million
Bandhan 750 million
Grameen Koota 310 million
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the MFI is much lower than if it approaches the bank in
the routine way.
Securitisation typically involves the conversion of assets
which have predictable future cash flows (for example,
a pool of microloans) into standardised, tradable securities.
The securitisation process allows MFIs to pool the receiv-
ables from loans and sell the same to third parties like
banks, mutual funds and insurance companies. This is an
opportunity for MFIs to increase their funding sources. The
assigned and securitised portfolios held by banks as of 31st
March 2010 are believed to aggregate to around Rs 42
billion (RBI Report, 2011).
The primary objective of securitisation is to obtain
financing for a company’s ongoing business needs.
However, a properly structured financial asset securitisa-
tion also can permit a company to obtain a lower cost of
financing compared to secured or even unsecured debt.
Securitisation allows the originator to remove the asset and
all corresponding risks associated with it completely from
its balance sheet. It also reduces the need to hold capital
against the asset. The broad structure of transactions (as in
the case of securitisation) e including bankruptcy remote-
ness, limited recourse to originator, performance of
servicing function by the originator, and permissible com-
mingling of pool collections with servicer’s own funds e are
common to both assignment and securitisation.
Assignment and securitisation can be in two forms,
namely, (a)with recourseand (b)without recourse.When the
assignment/securitisation is with recourse, the MFI remains
fully exposed to the risk of default of the underlying loans
though the loans themselves are not reflected in its financial
statements. When the assignment/securitisation is without
recourse, the MFI has no exposure on the loan portfolio but it
is customary for the MFI to offer credit enhancement in the
form of a dedicated fixed deposit or in other forms. When
banks acquire assigned or securitised loans, they become the
owners of those loans. They have therefore an obligation
before they acquire the assigned or securitised loans, to
ensure that the loans have beenmade in accordancewith the
terms of the specified regulations (RBI Report, 2011).Equitas Microfinance 480 million
Sahayata Microfinance,
Asirvad, Sonata, Satin
Creditcare
310 million
Spandana 250 million
Grameen Financial Services 290 million
Janalaxmi Fin Services 250 million
Share 700 million
Grameen Koota 250 million
SKS 1370 million
Sahayata Microfinance,
Asirvad, Sonata, Satin
Creditcare
270 million
SKS 1370 million
Share 490 million
Equitas 420 million
Equitas 160 million
Total 8670 million
Source Srinivasan (2010), Microfinance India, State of the Sector
Report, p. 55.Securitisation deals
In the international context, in 2006,Morgan Stanley arranged
and placed its first securitisation of loans to MFIs. The second
securitisation deal in 2007 had wider participation and was
the first rated securitisation of loans to MFIs. It succeeded in
attracting 21 investors, almost twice the number that
purchased the firm’s similar but unrated transaction of the
previous year. Convinced of investor demand formicrofinance
investments, Morgan Stanley has developed its own origina-
tion platform to provide a capital market’s contribution. To
support the platform, the firm’s Microfinance Institutions
Group developed an internal credit analysis and rating
approach to assess the risk of microfinance institutions rela-
tive to any other issuers through a global (foreign and local
currency) scale rating (Miguel et al., 2008).
In the Indian context, apart from the bilateral assign-
ment deals of a few banks, institutions such as IFMR Capital
and Grameen Capital India have designed differentstructures whereby the loan receivables are divided into
smaller pools, rated by credit rating agencies and then
transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV); the pools are
then bought out by investors. IFMR Capital has structured,
arranged and co-invested in a Rs 1063.8 million (24 million
USD) securitisation, backed by 105,422 microcredit loans
originated by microfinance institutions. The SPV Gamma
Pioneer IFMR Capital 2010 created for the transaction, has
issued three tranches of securities rated by CRISIL, India’s
foremost rating agency. The size, the performance of
microfinance securitisations in the capital markets and the
wide investor base e all contributed to a successful
placement at a low credit spread. The structure created by
IFMR Capital ensures that the incentives of the originator,
servicer and structurer are aligned. While the originator
and servicer provide cash collateral of 9.4% of the pool
principal, the structurer, IFMR Capital, has invested in the
subordinated junior tranche. The cash collateral and the
subordination of payments to the junior tranche in the
waterfall mechanism ensure that the senior investor is
protected against losses up to Rs 241.6 million. The first
losses are met from the cash collateral provided by the
originator and the second losses are borne by the subordi-
nated junior tranche investors. Following this several
securitisation deals took place (see Table 4).
How MFI securitisation deals are different
Absence of true sale
One of the significant merits of a securitisation transaction
is that a substantial chunk of the securities issued qualify
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requirement that the transfer of the asset from its origi-
nating entity separates the asset from the default risk of
the originator. In securitisation parlance, this is termed
true sale, but in MFI securitisation deals, there is a strong
connection between MFI and its credit portfolio. Thus true
sale character is missing in these deals.
Originating and servicing
In securitisation, it is common to distinguish between the
origination, funding and servicing of a financial asset. The
originator is the party that creates the asset. All subse-
quent interactions with the borrower e collections,
information, borrower relationships, problem resolution,
etc, are collectively termed ‘servicing’. For many finan-
cial assets, the origination and servicing can be divorced
without causing a loss to the asset value. For example, in
the case of securitisation of car loans and housing loans,
loans are originated by a commercial bank and sold to an
SPV which then sells them off to capital markets through
securitisation. In such transactions, the servicing function
is regularly outsourced to a third party. This can be done
successfully because servicing practices are fairly stand-
ardised, and the borrowers continue to pay their periodic
instalments regardless of the current owner of the loan.
There is no need for the originator to maintain
a continuing affinity with the borrowers, as this loan, or
at least its servicing component, is not ‘relationship-
based’. Even in cases where securitised loans remain with
the originating lender, investors reserve the right to
execute such transfers, termed servicer migrations, later
in the loan’s life. However, most microfinance loans are
created, nurtured, and serviced by the field officer who
maintains a regular franchise with the borrower. Collec-
tion of microfinance receivables in most places is not
based on technology but on manual effort (Rozas and
Kothari, 2010).
Uniqueness of asset class
In comparison to traditional asset classes such as auto,
commercial vehicle and mortgage loans, microfinance loans
present some distinct features like unique borrower profile,
dependence on group credit behaviour as opposed to indi-
vidual credit behaviour and relatively lower rating of
originators.
Borrower profile5
The typical borrower of a microfinance loan is a self-
employed person. While the specific nature of the business
may vary (eg. groceries, livestock, tailoring) such borrowers
are characterised by low financial literacy, a lack of personal
information to enable format credit underwriting and the
absence of a steady, predictable source of income.5 Indian Micro Finance Securitisations,www.fitchratings.com, 16
November 2010.Group credit behaviour
In contrast to conventional retail loans, the repayment of
microfinance loans is dependent on group credit behaviour.
In the joint liability group model used by many MFIs, the
creditworthiness of an individual depends on cross guar-
antees by other members of the peer group. The risk pre-
sented by the lack of personal information based credit
underwriting is mitigated by staggered loan disbursements,
where additional members are disbursed loans only after
the initial members of the group have exhibited satisfac-
tory credit behaviour. The strength of the microfinance
model is that while the loans are unsecured, losses are
relatively low because of peer group pressure or cross
guarantees from other members (termed ‘group collat-
eral’). However, such group collateral can potentially
become problematic in instances where close contact
between borrowers turns into group resistance to pay
(stemming from an actual or perceived grievance) and into
large scale delinquency.Risk mitigation
Most portfolio assignment and securitisation transactions
have some level of protection, whether by having the MFI
cover the first several percent of losses, provide additional
loans as collateral that can be swapped for non-performing
loans, or even set aside cash as a guarantee. These risk
mitigation techniques ensure that investors will not suffer
losses in most cases of loan deterioration. The rating of
microcredit pools and securities is based largely on the
analysis of repayment history and the level of risk coverage
provided via these techniques.
The RBI has proposed refinement to securitisation
guidelines in order to revamp the market practice and avoid
high risks associated with very limited period holding of
such paper in the hands of investors. It has proposed under
the draft guidelines a minimum holding period (MHP) and
a minimum retention (MR) in the hands of the originator. To
improve transparency, the RBI committee on MFI has made
the following recommendations (RBI Report, 2011):
 Disclosure is to be made in the financial statements of
MFIs of the outstanding loan portfolio which has been
assigned or securitised and the MFI continues as an
agent for collection. The amounts assigned and
securitised must be shown separately.
 Where assignment or securitisation is with recourse,
the full value of the outstanding loan portfolio assigned
or securitised should be considered as risk-based assets
for calculation of capital adequacy.
 Where the assignment or securitisation is without
recourse but credit enhancement has been given, the
value of the credit enhancement should be deducted
from the net owned funds for the purpose of calculation
of capital adequacy.
The interview with functionaries of the MFIs, Grameen
Financial Services Pvt. Ltd (Grameen Koota) and Equitas
Microfinance India Pvt. Ltd. illustrate many of the issues
raised in the note.
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EquitasFollowing are excerpts of the interview with Mrs Haridarshini
of Grameen Finanical Services Pvt. Ltd. (Grameen Koota).
Mrs Haridarshini is Management Information System (MIS)
senior specialist at Grameen Koota, Bangalore head
office and has been with the organisation for four years.
She holds a Bachelor of Engineering degree, with
specialisation in Electronics and Communications Engg.
from NIT Warangal.Q: What are the sources of funds for Grameen Koota
(GK)?
A: Bank loans have been the traditional source of funds
for us. However, some banks are showing interest in buying
out the loans originated by us, which would fetch
a reasonable amount of funds to finance our operations. GK
has also been raising funds by issuing non-convertible
debentures (NCD) for long term funds. With the help of
IFMR, GK has completed three rounds of securitisation of its
loans and is actively planning to raise more funds from
institutional investors and venture capitalists.
Q: Which banks usually buy out microloans from GK?
A: Most of the banks usually buy out microloans to fulfil
the priority sector regulations stipulated by RBI. Most of
these banks are either commercial private or nationalised
banks. Recent banks include ICICI, Axis and IndusInd Banks.
At the end of the financial year, the majority of the banks
know how much they are short of fulfilling the priority
sector needs. So, most of them approach us during that
period. However, many banks have continuous tracking
systems for their priority sector fulfilments, and hence they
come to us as and when needed throughout the year. These
banks give lower rates than the banks coming at the end of
the financial year (usually the former is at 9% while the
latter is as high as 12%). The bargaining positions of GK and
the banks change according to demand and supply for the
microloans; most of them are priority sector loans.
However, the regulation is that no bank can invest more
than 20% of its priority sector portfolio into one MFI. And
even GK has the policy of not selling the entire loan port-
folio to a particular bank.
Q: How about the debt financing option for your
operations?
A: GK has raised Rs 20 crore (200 million) by issuing non-
convertible debentures (NCDs) on the Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE) on Jan 22, 2010. MicroVest, a US micro-
finance investment vehicle that is registered as a Foreign
Institutional Investor (FII) with SEBI, has subscribed to this
issue. Perhaps this is the first time an Indian MFI has directly
accessed FII investments into its NCDs. Subsequently in
March 2011 DWM, an FII, has invested Rs 35 crore (350
million) in GK’s NCD.
Q: Increasingly equity investors have shown interest in
MFIs in India. What is the experience of GK in attracting
such equity investments?
A: In the beginning of 2008, Aavishkaar Goodwell
(Aavishkaar Goodwell India Microfinance DevelopmentCompany Ltd), a for-profit business development company,
invested Rs 9.2 crore (92 million) in GK. It was the first
round of equity investment by an outsider, apart from GK’s
promoters. The second round of equity investment came
from MicroVentures SpA, MicroVentures Investments (an
affiliate of MicroVentures SpA), Incofin and Aavishkaar
Goodwell, an amount of nearly Rs 27.5 crore (275 million)
at the end of year 2009. The recent third round in equity
investments was concluded in the beginning of year 2010,
an amount of Rs 25 crore (250 million) by MicroVentures
Funds and Incofin.
After converting to an NBFC in year 2007, GK has been
aggressively pursuing its goal of serving the bottom of the
pyramid and has increased its loan portfolio to more than Rs
327 crore (3270 million) as of March 2010.
Q: GK was able to raise equity as well as debt funds.
What was the need for going in for securitisation
products?
A: Banks insist on a residual maturity of at least three
months for microloans whereas loans with residual maturity
of as low as one month are accepted for securitisation. In
fact, most banks accept only priority sector loans, whereas
securitisation allows non-priority sector loans aswell. Most of
the securitised loans are saleable assets and there are many
investors who invest in these securities along with banks. In
fact, GK was able to achieve a reduction of 300 basis points
in its cost of funding through the issues of pass-through
certificates than through other sources of funds. The other
advantage of securitisation is that it is initiated by GK itself,
unlike in outright portfolio sale where GK has to wait for
a prospective buyer. However, securitisation is costly, as it
involves legal and credit rating assessment processes. GK has
adopted securitisation as an important source for raising
funds from the market. Securities issued by GK were bought
by banks, mutual funds and other financial institutions.
Q: IFMR Capital seems to be the sole arranger of
securitisation for most Indian MFIs. How have GK’s rela-
tions with IFMR been?
A: IFMR has been a pioneer in the securitisation of
microfinance loans. IFMR is the arranger for the securiti-
sation of GK’s microloans. GK has done two securitisation
deals with IFMR till now, both in 2010, one in March and the
other in June. The first round of securitisation was for Rs
26.47 crore (264.7 million) and the second round for Rs
31.15 crore (311.5 million).
Briefly, the securitisation process is as follows: GK
approaches IFMR for securitisation of its microloans and the
amount to be securitised. After due diligence and cash flow
analysis of the portfolio, the subsequent credit rating by
CRISIL is considered for assessment of return on the port-
folio. GK provides cash/credit collateral to its special
purpose vehicle created for securitisation. Usually, GK gives
first loss default guarantee, while the second loss default
guarantee is assumed by the arranger (IFMR).
Q: What are the characteristics of cash flows in case of
securitisation and outright portfolio sale?
A: In case of outright portfolio sale to banks, the cash
flows to banks are on a monthly basis, whereas in the case
of securitisation the cash flows are on a weekly or fort-
nightly basis. There is no hard rule that it should be like
this. It is at the convenience of and as per the contract
between GK and its investors. Every Saturday, all the loan
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pass-through-securities are made on Wednesday of the
following week. In fact, GK was able to revolve the extra
day’s cash available with it to new customers and hence
expand its operations.
Q: Could you please explain your operations strategy?
A: GK has been following Joint Liability of Group
Members strategy like typical microfinance institutions. It
starts with loans of Rs 10,000 to initial clients, and based on
credit history, loans up to a maximum of Rs 30,000 are given
as revolving loan facility. There are no covenants attached
to the usage of these loans. Clients are given the liberty for
the best use of their loan amount for any income generating
activity. Identification and gauging of each member of the
group is easier as other members of the group track them
continuously. At the bare minimum, voter ID card or ration
card copy is accepted as proof of identity as part of reduced
Know Your Customer (KYC) norms of RBI.
Q: How are the human resources motivated? What are
the incentive structures in the organisation?
A: The whole organisation can be divided into parts and
sub-parts such as Area, Branch, Regional office and Head
office in the order of bottom up of the organisation. Most of
the employees are given fixed plus variable salary (60%
fixed and 40% based on performance linked portfolio
growth). In fact, most of the employees are motivated by
the social cause of microfinance, and GK in particular.
Q: What is the way ahead for the future growth of GK?
What are its strategies to fulfil its goals and also survive
the competition?
A: GK’s policy is not to enter areas where more than
three MFIs are already operating. However, we want to
provide new products for our clients such as water, sani-
tation, cooking stove, housing and education loans, which
are not provided by other MFIs.
There is more demand for microfinance than supply of it.
Hence, the only constraint for us is to secure sufficient funds
to meet the demand and expand operations exponentially.Following are excerpts of the interview with V G Suchindran
and G Gopalakrishnan of Equitas Microfinance India Pvt.
Ltd.
Mr Suchindran VG (Vice President & Head of Treasury & Risk
Management), was part of the Treasury team which
focussed on diversification of funding sources and
consequently looked at issuance of pass-through
certificates (PTC) for Equitas. Prior to joining Equitas, he
served as Deputy Manager-Treasury at Cholamandalam
Investment & Finance Company Ltd and also as Financial
Analyst at Citibank NA. He is a Fellow member of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI),
Associate member of ICSI and also a graduate of ICWAI.
Mr G Gopalakrishnan (Senior Manager e Treasury) is the
key member of Treasury team. Prior to joining Equitas,
he served as Assistant Manager e Audit & Assurance at
Deloitte Haskins & Sells and also as Senior Business
Associate at Blend Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. He is an
Associate member of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (ICAI).Q: Equitas was the first MFI to go for rated securiti-
sation in India. Could you please explain the processes
involved in microloan securitisation and the first expe-
rience of doing it?
A: IFMR Capital and YES Bank were pivotal in making the
first securitisation of our microloans a success. IFMR Capital
is the only institution in India that has come forward to
build the securitisation market for microfinance loans in
India. In fact, Equitas microloan securitisation is the first of
kind transaction for IFMR too.
In this securitisation process, IFMR analyses cash flows of
the microloan portfolio and then creates tranches of
securities. In doing so, it also requires Equitas to provide
credit or cash collateral to enhance the quality of the
securities. Based on credit enhancement and risk-return
analysis, the rating agency (CRISIL) assigns credit rating for
different tranches of the securities. For example, in our
first securitisation issue, two tranches were created, Series
A1 and Series A2. Series A2 was subordinated to Series A1,
in the sense that after Series A1 holders are paid
completely what is due to them, only then will Series A2
holders be eligible to get the residual returns. Equitas will
serve the first-loss default, if it happens, from its cash/
credit collateral for the senior tranche investors only. An
SPV was created (in this case IFMR Trust Pioneer I) to
acquire the ownership of the portfolio and also to discharge
the obligations to investors as trustee of their securities.
YES Bank is the investor for this first securitisation and
has completely subscribed to the senior tranche worth Rs
125.4 crore (1254 million). IFMR Capital has purchased the
junior tranche for itself.
Q: Equitas seems to have many firsts to its credit in the
microfinance sector, especially for its securitised loan
PTCs. What are the inherent strengths seen by mutual
funds who have invested for the first time in microloan
securities issued by Equitas (in fact, the first in micro-
finance history in India by mutual funds)?
A: Our second securitisation through IFMR Trust Pioneer
II was a three tranche issue: Series A1, Series A2 and Series
A3 PTCs. The first one, Series A1, being short term security
and high credit rating (of 12 months maturity and P1þ(so)
rated), has attracted many investors as these PTCs have
offered better returns than other similar risk assets in the
market. These securities were considered good quality
assets (backed by historic collection efficiency and resul-
tant lower delinquency for the entire MFI asset class) in
their portfolios as they have low correlation with other
securities in the market. The largest mutual fund in India,
ICICI Prudential Asset Management, has garnered a large
part of the securities issued by the SPV based on loans
originated by Equitas in this round.
Dhanalakshmi Bank has invested in the entire AA(so)
rated Series A2 along with balance amount in P1þ rated
Series A1. The AA(so) was subsequently upgraded to
AAA(so) by CRISIL.
The third tranche, Series A3, originally rated BBB(so)
now upgraded to A(so) was purchased by Axis Bank and IFMR
Capital.
Q: The recent securitisation (third round) of micro-
loans by Equitas was the largest ever securitisation to
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What could be the reason behind increased activism from
the investor side in microloan securities?
A: Many institutional investors are finding microloan
securities to be worthy investments. For example, the
whole short term security (Series A1 of maturity 12 months
and highly rated P1þ(so)) is subscribed by UTI Mutual Fund,
whereas the relatively long term security, Series A2 (of
AA(so) rated and of maturity 20 months) was purchased by
HDFC Bank and Reliance Capital. And the third tranche,
Series A3 (of BBB(so) rated and of maturity 20 months) was
held by IFMR Capital along with Reliance Capital.
Most mutual funds are purchasing short term securities
as they offer higher returns than standard commercial
papers of the same rating, and they are also more liquid
than high-tenor securities. But banks are indifferent to
long term securities, preferring perhaps to trade off long
term securities with the loans they usually provide to
MFIs, as the former are tradable securities while the later
are not.
Q: What is the difference between ‘Premium’ and
‘Par’ structures of securitised PTCs of microloans?
A: Most of the microloans are considered as risky, as
loans by banks, as they are unsecured loans. Prepayment of
loans is allowed in almost all cases; hence there are
inherent default risks and prepayment risks in cash flows of
microloans. These risks will impact the level of credit
enhancement required for the pool of securities, either par
or premium structure. In case of par structure, the default
or prepayment of higher interest loans in the pool will
reduce the excess interest spread (EIS) if available in the
form of credit enhancement. On the other hand, in case of
premium structure, the default or prepayment of higher
interest loans in the pool will lead to premium loss. Hence,
this may require utilisation of credit enhancement to fulfil
the remaining obligations. Based on default probabilities
and prepayment rates, the par or premium structures will
require different levels of credit enhancements.
Q: What are the improvements in securitisation after
three rounds?
A: The credit quality of the securities and diversification
of tranches to meet the needs of different investors has
evolved over time. In fact, the cash collateral has come
down from 1st round (11.7% of total PTCs value, Rs 156.7
crore/1567 million) through 2nd round (10.6% of total PTCs
value, Rs 481.2 crore/4812 million) to 3rd round (9.4% of
total PTCs value, Rs 985.3 crore/9853 million), though the
total amount of securitisation has increased exponentially.
Also, there has been secondary market transaction
wherein the PTC was purchased by Reliance Mutual Fund
from one of the existing bank investors.
Thus, diversification of the investor base in microloan
securities increased drastically to include investors such as
banks (Yes Bank, Axis Bank, Dhanalakshmi Bank, HDFC Bank
etc.), mutual funds (ICICI Prudential Mutual Fund, Reliance
Mutual Fund, UTI Mutual Fund etc.) and NBFCs (eg. Reliance
Capital). With this knowledge and experience, Equitas is
confidently approaching the market to raise low cost funds
and hence scale up its operations quickly to serve the large
unmet demand for microfinance. Moreover, Equitas’
securitisation of its microloans has been the beacon light
for many other MFIs in India.Q: Why are most of the MFIs in India, including Equi-
tas, non-deposit taking NBFCs? If RBI allows Equitas to
accept deposits, what would be the reaction?
A: Equitas is a non-deposit taking NBFC (ND-NFBC) the
same as all other MFIs in India. The legal structure of the
ND-NBFC is different from the deposit-taking NBFCs
which are heavily regulated by the RBI and are also
obliged to follow many norms prescribed by the RBI from
time to time. With the present form of ND-NBFC, the MFIs
can serve the market well. However, the real objective
of ‘inclusive finance’ will be achieved if the MFIs are
allowed to accept deposits from their clients, as the MFIs
have increased their reach to the last mile customer in
remote areas. Moreover, the client can avail both credit
as well as deposit facilities from the same MFI. In fact, in
the long run this may reduce the cost of funds for MFIs
and hence lead them to charge their clients less interest
on microloans. But there is a long way to go in that
direction.
Q: Though the loans as well as the borrowings probably
are small tenor, are there any gaps in assets/liability
management?
A: Microfinance is more like a cash-and-carry business, in
which the maturity of the borrowed assets in almost equal
to the tenor of the microloans, hence resulting is zero
asset-liability gaps. However, funds management is the key
in microfinance as it involves size transformation rather
than maturity transformation. In traditional banking small
deposits are aggregated to big loans, whereas in MFIs large
borrowings are fragmented into small loans. So, it requires
different management skills.
Q: What are the alternative sources of funding for
Equitas other than securitisation?
A: Many banks namely, public sector undertakings
(PSUs) as well as private sector banks and financial insti-
tutions like SIDBI have provided good support to augment
the resources of the company. Also, the primary debt
rating of the company was upgraded from BBB-(stable) to
BBB(stable) apart from the sector specific MFI grading,
which was upgraded twice from mfR4 to mfR2. Besides,
many private equity investors have shown interest in
Equitas. Within eight months of commencing operations, it
was able to raise Rs 50 crore (500 million) by issuing
Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares. Also, SIDBI
has an equity stake of around 5%, thus enabling Equitas to
maintain a capital adequacy ratio of 48.35% as on 31st
March 2010, which was very much higher than the minimum
capital adequacy requirement (12%) stipulated for the
NBFC by RBI.
Equitas relied on term loans extended by many banks for
most of its funds requirement. Though bilateral assign-
ments (loan portfolio sale by Equitas to banks), have
generated additional funds for operations, this is very much
dependent on demand from banks to fill their priority
lending gaps. Though the company has not gone to debt
markets to raise funds through non-convertible debentures,
it is in the process of issuing subordinated debt of a longer
tenor of eight years, which is expected to be invested in by
SIDBI.
Q: There are many operational risks involved in
microcredit operations apart from financial risks. What
are the risk-mitigating steps taken by Equitas?
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place, to track each and every process. It uses technology
wherever possible to make the credit delivery and recovery
hassle-free for both the field employees and clients. To sta-
bilise the processes and also to scale up the operations to
multiple locations, the company has migrated its core
banking system to Europe-based Temenos’ T24 platform,
which can handle the complexity of operations at Equitas.
This system has been fully integrated with the Optical Mark
Recognition (OMR) application used to automatically capture
about 70% of themembership form information of each client
and hence reduce human errors. The field level operational
processes are controlled through mobile phone-SMS based
information, which in turn is linked to an internal database in
the head office. For example, if any employee is scheduled to
have a meeting at a particular place with a specific group of
clients, then the meeting schedules and minutes of the
meeting and like information will be fed into the system.
Clients are encouraged to take receipt of payment immedi-
ately after their Equated Fortnight Instalment (EFI) payment
to their field employees. Field employees are also involved in
the process of sharing information with the head office about
the happenings and insights gained at the field.
Q: How is the business model of Equitas different from
other MFIs in India? What are the key factors contributing
to its growth?
A: As is the case with any microfinance institution,
Equitas too follows joint liability group lending practices
and hence the remaining members of the group will be
liable to pay the due amount of the defaulting member.
However, as an internal code of conduct, Equitas encour-
ages its employees to find clients whose monthly family
income is at least 10 times the EFI amount, so as to main-
tain asset quality of the loans issued to the borrowers.
Most of the loans are standard types of Silver (Rs 10,100),
Gold (Rs 12,000) and Diamond (Rs 15,000) and for a maximum
tenor of two years. It also issues loans for specific purposes
such as education for which a gold loan based on minimum
criteria is given. In fact, Equitas maintains two levels of field
employees, one for client acquisition and another for
customer relationship management. These employees are
responsible for acquiring quality clients and also to increase
value out of the client to serve him/her better.
Most of the MFIs in India have weekly instalment
collection periods, but Equitas is following fortnightly
collection. This would obviously reduce the employee cost
per client and hence operational efficiency. The delin-
quency in payments due to longer duration as with other
MFIs has been taken care of by putting proper processes and
systems in place.
Perhaps Equitas is the first and only MFI in India to issue
ESOPs to all its employees as part its incentive structure. In
fact, most of the field level employees are given a good mix
of fixed and performance pay plus a good working envi-
ronment, apart from support like health insurance cover for
immediate family with parents.
Also, Equitas donates 5% of its annual profits to Equitas
Development Initiatives Trust (EDIT), which focuses on
health care of members’ family as well as education for
members’ children. Also, a budget of Rs 2000/- per month
per branch is provided to all fully operational branches of
Equitas to conduct medical camps involving eye care,cancer screening, testing for kidney related diseases,
veterinary camps etc.
Concluding observations
The above interviews underscore that securitisation deals
arewell structured and are a suitable avenue formeeting the
funding requirements of MFIs; however, with MFIs being less
regulated, the sector is exposed to systemic risks. There is
ample evidence of multiple borrowing by poor clients from
various sources of informal and semi formal sources ranging
from chit funds,moneylenders and private financiers to SHGs
and MFIs. What is amore recent and amoreworrying trend in
this sector is the extent of multiple borrowing (or double
dipping) among various MFIs (Kamath & Srinivasan, 2009). In
the Indian context, the microfinance sector is in a serious
credibility crisis. The symptoms of the crisis showed up in
2006 in the Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh, where the
district authorities closed down two major MFIs. The action
of the administration followed a complaint lodgedby someof
the borrowers of these MFIs against their alleged ‘usurious
interest rate’ and ‘forced loan recovery’ practices
(Shylendra, 2006). The Krishna Crisis was resolved largely
through compromises made by the MFIs and the formulation
of an industry code of conduct by organisations like Sa-Dhan.
But increased commercialisation of MFI activities with the
entry of private equity and the money raised through IPOs
giving access to huge capital, increased the scale of the
business. This resulted in huge lending activity at exorbitant
interest rates, pushing the rural public into a serious debt
trap. MFIs not only competed with each other but also out-
paced government funded welfare programmes. Andhra
Pradesh, one of the more active states in microfinance, has
seen a wide conflict of interest between government and
MFI activities. There were several complaints against MFIs
for the charging of exorbitant interest rates and forced loan
recovery practices, which sometimes resulted in suicides by
borrowers. The localmedia (especially the electronicmedia)
extensively covered the coercive loan recovery practices of
MFIs. As a result of these developments, the AP government
issued an ordinance on October 15, 2010 on the following
four premises: MFIs charge usurious interest rates; if clients
fail to pay on time, MFIs use coercive methods to collect
interest; MFIs make huge profits; they have no social mission
to help the poor. However, the resolution may have sowed
the seeds of a larger conflict between MFIs and the govern-
ment. As per the ordinance, no MFI was allowed to carry out
its operations until they registered with the government and
all existing operations were halted. The resultant borrower
indiscipline and defaulting in loan repayment led to
a reduction in cash flow and the drying up of fresh capital
from financial institutions. There was chaos in the micro
finance sector due to lax regulation. If the trend continues,
the industry faces collapse in a statewheremore than a third
of its borrowers live. Lenders are also having trouble in
making new loans in other states, because banks have slowed
lending to them as fears of defaults have grown.
Concerted efforts are needed to invigorate the social
engine of microfinance enterprises. As Nair (2010) has
pointed out, increased dynamic participation of mainstream
capital market, through IPOs and private equity, would
eventually undermine the social value creation role of the
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trends in the current phase of development of the Indian
microfinance sector. The trends observed include the rise of
a class of profit seeking microfinance promoters, progressive
marginalisation of the poor microfinance clients, and the
increasing influence of investor interests in the governance
and management of transformed MFIs. Conroy (2010) warns
that rapid growth in asset size and excessive financialisation
may lead to another subprime crisis.
Efforts are being made to create distributed financial
institutions and to apply technological solutions. The RBI
appointed Malegam Committee has emphasised the need for
prudential practices and improving governance. It has made
recommendations on loan limits, interest rates, provisioning
and capital adequacy norms. The RBI has accepted most of
them with modifications. Regulatory solutions are needed for
deposit mobilisation activity among the poor to build
a sustainable model for microfinance. Reddy (2011) has sug-
gested several measures to revive the MFI industry. Micro-
finance institutions have to enhance their profitability by
offering a wider array of fee-based services such as money
transfer services by extensive application of technology.
Strengthening of partnership with mainstream banking insti-
tutions is needed. Borrowers have to graduate from micro-
credit and look for larger loans from banks. Banks have to
identify potential borrowers and encourage them in such
migration. Savings are the backbone of financial services
activity and savings activity is the entry activity formainstream
financial activities; hence the regulators should encourage
MFIs to mobilise savings, with proper checks and balances.
Specialised debt financing vehicles must be complemented
with commercial bank funding. Bond issues and securitisation
still remain the most attractive capital market participation.
While assessing the microfinance institutions and the
microfinance activity in India, we need to bear in mind the
statement made by Rajan6 who says, ‘The microfinance
sector has made some mistakes which politicians have
exaggerated in an effort to destroy an industry that
undermines them by making the poor more independent’.References
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